Article 32 of Law N.14/60 sets out the conditions that must be met for the issuance of an interim injunction, which are the following:

a) The existence of a serious issue to be tried.

b) The existence of a visible probability that the plaintiff is entitled to relief in the main action, and

c) That it would be difficult or impossible to administer full justice at a later stage without the issuance of the injunction.

These conditions have been extensively analyzed in case law [see Οδυσσέως v. Pieris Estates (1982) 1 Α.Α.Δ. 557, Κυτάλα κ.ά. v. Χρυσάνθου κ.α. (1996) 1 (Α) Α.Α.Δ. 253, Κ.Ο.Τ. v. Θεωρή (1989) 1 (Ε) Α.Α.Δ. 255, M. Ch. Mitsingas Tr. Ltd κ.ά. v. Timberland (1997) 1 (Γ) Α.Α.Δ. 1791, Parico Aluminium Designs Ltd. v. Muskita Aluminium Co. Ltd. κ.ά. (2002) 1 (Γ) Α.Α.Δ. 2015, etc.].

The first condition implies nothing more than the disclosure of an arguable case based on the written pleadings.

As for the second, it is sufficient for the Court to be satisfied that there is a visible probability of success. This has been interpreted to mean something more than a mere possibility, but much less than the balance of probabilities.

The third condition, as analyzed in the Οδυσσέως case (above), relates to the adequacy of the remedy in light of the facts of each case.

As stated in Mitsingas Ltd v. Timberland (1997) 1 Α.Α.Δ. 1791:
“The criterion for the issuance of an interim injunction is the inability to administer full justice at a later stage. The concept of justice is not connected solely to the narrow sense of material damage but to the broader protection of the applicant’s rights.”

As indicated in Οδυσσέως (above), the Court, at the final stage, must weigh whether it is just and reasonable to issue the requested injunction [see Ιπποδρομιακή Αρχή v. Χ” Βασίλη (1989) 1 Α.Α.Δ. (Ε) 152].

At this stage, the Court examines the evidence before it only to decide whether it is fair to issue the injunction and does not resolve the disputed issues on which the main application will be judged (Jonitexo Ltd. v. Adidas (1984) 1 Α.Α.Δ. 263). All the issues raised in the action remain alive to be decided at trial (Δημοκρατία της Σλοβενίας ν. Beograska Banka D.D. (1999) 1 (A) Α.Α.Δ. 225, 236).
During the adjudication of an interim injunction, the Court is not permitted to delve into the conflicting versions of the parties and examine them (Ν.Γ.Χ. ν. Τ.L., Appeal No. 32/2021, dated 23.6.2022).

Any findings by the Court are made solely for the purposes of considering whether or not to issue the interim injunction.

In the case of Σεβαστού v. Σεβαστού (2002) 1 Α.Α.Δ. 1980, the following was noted regarding the Court’s duty at the stage of interim applications:
“Some preliminary, even minimal, evaluation of the evidence is necessary so the Court can assess the evidentiary strength of each side — even within the limited scope of examination at this stage.”

The requirements under Article 32 of Law N.14/60, as mentioned above, are evaluated based on the facts brought before the Court and the applicable law, in this case, the Parents and Children Relations Law 216/90.

According to Article 5(1)(a) of Law 216/90, parental responsibility is both a duty and a right of the parents, which is exercised jointly.

According to Article 5(1)(b) of the same Law, parental responsibility includes the determination of the child’s name, the care of the person, management of the property, and representation of the child in any matter or legal act affecting the child or the child’s property.

Article 9(1) of the same Law provides that custody of the child includes, in particular, the child’s upbringing and supervision, education, and the determination of the place of residence.

According to Efi Kounougeri-Manoledaki’s Family Law, Abridged Edition, p. 451, in reference to Article 1518 of the Greek Civil Code:
“Custody includes upbringing, supervision, education, and the determination of the child’s place of residence. These concepts partly overlap — for example, education (in school) is part of instruction (which includes extracurricular learning), and instruction itself falls within the broader concept of upbringing (which involves moral and social development). In essence, custody encompasses all care or measures concerning the intellectual, emotional, and physical development of the minor.”

In George Koumantos’ Lectures on Family Law, pp. 384–385:
“The legislator knows that proper custody of a child is a personal achievement of each parent and that legal rules are often too vague — and often self-evident — to be useful. However, the legislator may consider it appropriate to outline some guiding principles regarding the content of custody, both to guide parents and the Courts called upon to judge whether parental responsibility, and thus custody, is being exercised properly.”

According to Article 6(2)(a), a Court decision must aim at the best interest of the child (see Ευγ. Στυλιανού ν. Βασ. Στυλιανού, Διευθύντρια Τμήματος Υπηρεσιών Κοινωνικής Ευημερίας ν. Ντούμα κ.ά. (2001) 1 (Γ) Α.Α.Δ. 1911). The paramount principle the Court must consider in such cases is the welfare of the minor (see Ιακωβίδης v. Ιακωβίδου, Ε.Δ.Ο.Δ. 95, 30/6/2000 (2000) 1 Α.Α.Δ. 1108).

As stated in Κκουφού ν. Κκουφού (1997) 1 (Γ) Α.Α.Δ. 1588, 1593:
“Forming a judgment on parental responsibility issues is a delicate and complex task. It is not about attributing blame or imposing sanctions for misconduct. The guiding principle is the interest of the minor, and all relevant factors must be taken into account.”

In Ιωαννίδης κ.ά. ν. Ιωαννίδη κ.ά. (2002) 1 (Γ) Α.Α.Δ. 1446, 1452:
“In parental responsibility proceedings, there is no adversarial character between the parents. It is an inquisitorial process whose ultimate aim is to best serve the child’s welfare and interest. Articles 6 and 14 of the law state that the primary criterion for parental responsibility is the best interest of the child — a principle frequently affirmed in case law (see Στυλιανού ν. Στυλιανού, Ιακωβίδης ν. Ιακωβίδη). The principle can be summarized as: ‘The paramount consideration for the Court in such cases must always be the welfare of the minor.’”

In Family Law, 3rd Edition, 2022 by Apostolos S. Georgiadis, p. 623:
“The interest of the child includes physical, material, intellectual, emotional, moral, and overall welfare aimed at developing the minor into an independent and responsible personality. The Court’s decision concerning the assignment of parental responsibility must be guided by this interest.”

In The New Family Law by V. Vathrakokoilis, pp. 584–585:
“Criteria for the Court: In evaluating the child’s interest, the Court must not overemphasize the material conditions of the minor’s life and overlook the crucial factor of proper psychosomatic development. Emphasis must be placed on elements forming the appropriate environment for sound psychosomatic and intellectual development of the child, because — according to modern social views — comfort and material luxury do not shape the soul, body, and mind, but can be harmful. The child needs sound education and reasonable care — not corrupting luxury.”

“The law vaguely states the condition of ‘interest’ without defining it or providing specific criteria. This vague legal concept must be specified by the Court in each case. The Court must consider psychological, primarily, as well as economic and medical aspects of the case, informed by contemporary pedagogical, psychological, and sociological knowledge. To form a sound judgment, the Court must assess the abilities of the parents, their environment, personal background, profession, social activity, possible deviation from proper conduct, and overall adaptability to the demands of modern times.”

The child’s will, depending on maturity, must be sought and considered (see Στυλιανού ν. Στυλιανού (1993) 1 Α.Α.Δ. 130, Πασιαρδή ν. Θεοδοσίου (2004) 1 Α.Α.Δ. 338, Π.Ε. ν. K.R.U., Appeal No. 23/2018, 3/12/2019).

According to Article 7 of Law 216/90, if the parents disagree in the exercise of parental responsibility and the interest of the child requires a decision, the Court decides following an application by either parent.

If the three conditions of Article 32 are satisfied, the Court proceeds further and, within the scope of its discretionary power, decides whether it is just and proper to issue the requested injunction (see Οδυσσέως ν. Pieris Estates κ.α. (1982) 1 Α.Α.Δ. 557, Ιπποδρομιακή Αρχή Κύπρου ν. Χατζηβασίλη (1989) 1 Α.Α.Δ. 152, ABP Holdings v. Κιταλίδη (1994) 1 Α.Α.Δ. 694 and Seamark Consultancy Services Ltd v. Lasala κ.α., Κυπριανού κ.α. v. Lasala κ.α., King Mazax Lines Ltd κ.α. v. Lasala κ.α. (2007) 1 Α.Α.Δ. 162 [Ολ]).

This process is known as the “balance of convenience”. In this context, the Court assesses the potential impact that the issuance of the requested injunctions may have on the interests of the parties. The Court must choose the path that entails the least risk of injustice.